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I have always been fascinated by the human capacity to imagine future 
worlds and describe what humanity would look like in the years or decades 
ahead. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Jules Verne wrote about 
electricity, submarines and flying balloons. A few decades later, Thea von 
Harbou and Fritz Lang gave birth to the world of Metropolis, which in many 
ways is a metaphor of contemporary societies. In the 1970s and 1980s, Isaac 
Asimov wrote about psychohistory, a discipline that combines statistics, 
psychology and history to predict how the behaviour of large groups would 
shape future events. Just as most of the things described by Verne, von 
Harbou and Lang, or Asimov seemed technologically and politically distant 
or unimaginable at their times, so do meaningful digital communities seem 
to be today.
Liav Orgad sees tremendous potential in digital technologies for recon-
structing the traditional notion of citizenship by shifting status, identity and 
the exercise of rights away from the state and closer to the individual. He 
believes that blockchain could enhance the current structure of international 
governance by strengthening human rights through the attribution of digital 
identities and by offering new models for political participation through 
cloud communities, which in turn would decrease the inequality engrained 
in, for instance, the principles of voting in the United Nations. In other 
words, with further development of blockchain technologies, states would 
no longer be the sole determinants of an individual’s legal status, or have the 
monopoly over the exercise of individual rights, or be the core community 
for identity ascription. In this sense, I am in agreement with Orgad, Primavera 
De Filippi and Francesca Strumia that we cannot but acknowledge that rap-
idly developing technologies are likely to ‘outsource’ many of the state’s 
functions to cyberspace. Even so, as has been pointed out by other contribu-
tors (Rainer Bauböck, Robert Post, Michael Blake and Peter Spiro), block-
chain technologies and cloud communities raise a number of concerns about 
governability and the exercise of self-sovereignty.
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 They want citizenship? Let them have digital identities 
instead!
In his kick-off contribution Orgad highlights that 1.1 billion people, or a 
sixth of  the global population  lack an official  identification. Such people, 
including many refugees, displaced persons, nomadic pastoralists or socially 
marginalised minorities like the Roma are consequently excluded from par-
ticipating in or accessing services of modern states. According to Orgad, 
blockchain technologies already provide the infrastructure for attributing 
such people global digital IDs, which would grant them recognition as 
‘human beings’. Blockchain-based digital IDs would enable individuals to 
create and register their own identity. This identity would be validated 
through multiple decentralised network nodes. It would also be permanent 
and immutable.
I agree with the general need to recognise every human being before the 
law. However, the attribution of a global digital ID scarcely resolves this 
problem  for  two  reasons. The first  one  is  recognition. Our  legal  status  is 
attributed by states recognising us as legal persons. The international system 
of mutual recognition among states allows us to be considered a legal per-
sona elsewhere precisely because the status that we have has been confirmed 
by a state. Hence, any global digital ID would still need to be recognised by 
states or an international organisation in order to have external validity. 
Initiatives, such as ID20201 speak about the need to tackle the problem of 
the  lack  of  ‘officially  recognised  identity’  through  digital  technology  but 
offer scarcely any practical pointers as to how these identities would be rec-
ognised and by whom. Furthermore,  if  such digital  identification were  to 
create a ‘status and identity complementary to national citizenships’, I am 
wondering what kind of status and rights it would yield for those whose 
predicament Orgad seeks to resolve. If a digital ID has no external recogni-
tion, it has little value for a person with no other proof of identity. They will 
still lack the status that a digital identity could complement but cannot sub-
stitute for. Isn’t the offer of digital identity for them a bit like Marie 
Antoinette’s cake for the hungry crowds in revolutionary Paris?





 Governance by blockchain: digital hierarchies or direct 
democracy?
Orgad’s second claim looks prima facie stronger. Recent experiments with 
blockchain-based virtual communities, such as Bitnation, indicate that 
blockchain technology has the potential to substitute or complement some 
elements of state governance. In theory, in a blockchain-based cloud com-
munity, members agree on a set of laws regulating their interaction, and 
these laws are then amended by consensus.
Pazaitis, De Filippi and Kostakis give the example of Backfeed (http://
backfeed.cc/) protocol as a conceptual model ‘for a new form of governance 
with an incentivisation system implemented on the blockchain.’2 This sys-
tem would be materialised through an organisational structure of decentral-
ised cooperation based on peer-to-peer evaluation and a reputation system 
as  grounds  for  allocating  communal  influence.  This  kind  of  cooperation 
would presume that a number of members come together to establish a digi-
tal community and reach a consensus on what values underpin that commu-
nity. Members of the community own certain initial amounts of ‘reputation’ 
tokens and they are incentivised to participate in communal decisions 
through a system that provides reputational gains to those who are best 
aligned with communal values. Those contributing voluntarily to ‘values’ 
receive a reward if 50 per cent of the tokens representing the community’s 
reputation have been invested in the evaluation of the voluntary contribu-
tion. The reward takes the form of reputation tokens, which are shared 
between the contributor and those who reached the consensus on the evalu-
ation. Whenever a person evaluates a new contribution, they also give away 
some of their existing reputation to it.
Let’s translate this into a thought experiment. Imagine there is a Backfeed- 
based community called Scientia, in which the core value were ‘knowl-
edge’. Scientia has been created by five members (A, B, C, D, and E), each 
of whom originally had 10 reputation tokens (i.e., the community has a total 
of 50 tokens). Member A comes up with a proposal to create an encyclopae-
dia of cloud communities and the proposal is put to communal vote. Votes 
can range from 1 to 5 (1 lowest contribution, 5 highest contribution). The 
proposal will go through if at least 25 reputation tokens have been invested 
in the evaluation.
2 Pazaitis, A., P. De Filippi & V. Kostakis (2017), ‘Blockchain and value systems 
in the sharing economy: The illustrative case of Backfeed’, Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 125: 105–115, at 111.
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Now, imagine a scenario where A invests 8 out of her initial 10 reputation 
tokens with a vote of 5; B invests 5 tokens with a vote of 5; C invests 3 
tokens with a vote of 3; D invests 5 tokens with a vote of 4; E invests 7 
tokens with a vote of 5. A total of 28 tokens have been invested, with three 
contributors voting 5, and hence the proposal is accepted. C and D will lose 
the 8 tokens they invested, and these will be distributed between A (4 
tokens), B (3 tokens), and E (1 token) in line with their initial reputation 
investment. The new count of reputation tokens would be 14 for A, 13 for B, 
7 for C, 5 for D, and 11 for E. In evaluating the subsequent proposal, A, B 
and E would have greater voting power, as they would hold three quarters of 
the community’s reputation tokens.
In my view, there are three problems with this kind of decision-making. 
First, the ‘overall evaluation of a specific contribution is based on the repu-
tation score’.3 This implies the use of a system of weighted voting, whereby 
individuals with higher reputation (i.e., with more tokens) have a greater say 
in communal decision-making. Paradoxically this would make the princi-
ples of deciding in such digital communities closer to those in ancient Rome, 
feudal Prussia, or French colonies where votes were weighted on grounds of 
‘wealth’ than to contemporary democracies based on the equality of votes. 
In other words, this kind of system would perpetuate inequality of member-
ship in a similar way as the Chinese social credit system described by 
Costica Dumbrava does. Second, even though the general idea of Backfeed- 
based governance is to incentivise participation through rewards, those with 
high rewards from previous rounds of evaluations may be less inclined to 
participate in new evaluations as that may result in their loss of reputation. 
Equally, ‘losers’ in the communal vote (such as the examples of C and D 
above) may face obstacles in putting forward or voting for any proposal due 
to limited resources at their disposal. Third, such a system could create 
incentives to bet with the winners rather than to invest into the values that 
one truly believes are in line with communal ones. This is antithetical to 
democracy and turns into a market where people pursue reputational gains 
instead of deliberating on what values they share. That is, a system in which 
reputation is gained and lost by ‘betting’ on the levels of contribution to 
communal value has the potential to create a stratified society in which deci-
sions are made by a small number of those willing to speculate on commu-
nal value.
An alternative to this would be to think how direct democracy could 
work in cloud communities. Presumably, protocols could be developed 
3 Above n. 1 at 110.
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that – unlike Backfeed – base decision-making on equal voting power for 
each digital identity and that offer a platform for deliberation rather than 
only for voting. Such communities would be similar to voluntary associa-
tions of individuals that adopt statutes providing for internally democratic 
governance: all members (independently of their duration of membership 
and place of residence) and members only can participate in decisions taken 
by the ‘demos’ of the association.
Now, let’s go back to the example of Scientia. Imagine that this time, 
Scientia were a voluntary decentralised blockchain-based community that 
operates on the basis of equal votes of its members A, B, C, D, and E. The 
community votes on A’s proposal for the encyclopaedia of cloud communi-
ties and the proposal passes due to positive votes of A, B, and E. Unlike in 
the previous example, since there are no reputational gains or losses, C and 
D will have the same voting power in the next ballot. Hence such a model 
would not disincentivise those who opposed the initiative. However, it 
would then not provide incentives for contributing in the future, as Backfeed 
is supposed to do. As Pazaitis, De Filippi and Kostakis rightly point out, this 
would lead to ‘to the gradual dissipation of the community members, who 
could no longer reflect themselves into the value system of the new entity.’4
So there is a dilemma of blockchain governance in cloud communities: 
will they be based on incentives that create hierarchies or on direct democ-
racy with scarce mechanisms for motivating participation?
 Citizenship as a business model?
In his kick-off contribution Orgad notes that the future of citizenship is 
dynamic and multi-layered. Yet so is the present, and so has been its past. 
The key question is whether we are ready to embrace a new approach to citi-
zenship, based on ‘smart contracts’ operating in cyberspace and regulating 
needs of individuals, just as a business model would do. For Spiro the recent 
trend towards a global market for passports exemplifies such an approach to 
citizenship: individuals with multiple passports have more choice where to 
settle, pay taxes, send their children to school, etc. Hence, in some respects, 
citizenship (albeit for a small number of people who can benefit from inves-
tor citizenship programmes) is already merely an access point to a market of 
goods and services that different providers (in this case states) offer.
As new technologies develop, digital markets will allow individuals to 
choose the services previously provided by the state from private  companies. 
4 Ibid.
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Indeed, some functions of the state have already been outsourced to compa-
nies operating in the digital world (e.g., online education instead of public 
schooling, car-sharing schemes instead of public transport, etc.). Perhaps 
the utopian vision of the ‘sharing economy’ is that public goods would be 
produced through horizontal and voluntary cooperation among consumers. 
Yet examples such as online degrees, Airbnb, Uber, and the likes prove the 
contrary. They follow the logic of the market and reveal the huge potential 
for corporate power based on network effects and ‘cartelisation’ of servic-
es.5 In considering the effects of citizenship as a business model, we also 
need to think about possible implications for some other core functions of 
the state, including adjudication and the provision of security.
And even if, in the spirit of the introductory paragraph, digital technolo-
gies bring along numerous benefits we have to recognise that their á la carte 
approach is hardly conducive to the creation of a community of shared val-
ues among members. That is, it is hardly conducive to citizenship.
5 Atzori, M. (2015), ‘Blockchain technology and decentralized governance: Is 
the state still necessary?’, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2709713 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2709713
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